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AbsTrACT 
The case of Charlie Gard, an infant with a genetic 
illness whose parents sought experimental treatment in 
the USa, brought important debates about the moral 
status of parents and children to the public eye. after 
setting out the facts of the case, this article considers 
some of these debates through the lens of parental 
rights. Parental rights are most commonly based on the 
promotion of a child’s welfare; however, in Charlie’s case, 
promotion of Charlie’s welfare cannot explain every fact 
of the case. Indeed, some seem most logically to extend 
from intrinsic parental rights, that is, parental rights 
that exist independent of welfare promotion. I observe 
that a strong claim for intrinsic parental rights can be 
built on arguments for genetic propriety and children’s 
limited personhood. Critique of these arguments 
suggests the scope of parental rights remains limited: 
property rights entail proper use; non-personhood 
includes only a small cohort of very young or seriously 
intellectually disabled children and the uniqueness of 
parental genetic connection is limited. Moreover, there 
are cogent arguments about parents’ competence to 
make judgements, and public interest arguments against 
allowing access to experimental treatment. Nevertheless, 
while arguments based on propriety may raise concerns 
about the attitude involved in envisioning children as 
property, I conclude that these arguments do appear 
to offer a prima facie case for a parental right to seek 
experimental treatment in certain limited circumstances.
InTroduCTIon
The case of Charlie Gard concerned the right of 
parents of an infant with a genetic illness to take 
him to the USA to receive experimental treatment 
against medical advice. In July 2017, a spokes-
person for the family announced that frustrating 
this right amounted to Charlie being ‘taken pris-
oner by the NHS’.1 In this article, I consider the 
basis and scope of parental rights (PR) in relation 
to the details of Charlie’s case, primarily drawn 
from the legal records.2–6 Discussion of moral rights 
is justified here because these should be accounted 
for in future cases. Further, moral rights can trans-
late to legal rights, and thus may ultimately compel 
particular decisions. I argue that, although the case 
was decided on welfare grounds, there is evidence 
of attention to rights of Charlie’s parents that are 
independent of a welfare basis—what I shall term 
‘intrinsic PR’. Exploring the basis of such rights, I 
suggest that the strongest philosophical argument 
for PR is that Charlie was a non-person and genet-
ically his parents’ property. These rights are strictly 
limited, and in Charlie’s case PR were outweighed 
by a precautionary approach to the uncertain harms 
accruing to Charlie. However, in future similar 
cases, PR may prove determinative where harms are 
excluded and potential benefits are great. I argue 
that parents are competent to exercise these rights, 
and that public interest concerns over access to 
experimental treatment can be allayed.
ChArlIe’s CAse
Charlie was born with infantile-onset mitochon-
drial DNA depletion syndrome (MDDS). MDDS 
is a genetic disease where abnormal mitochondrial 
DNA causes cells to malfunction. Different strains 
of MDDS cause variable levels of disability. Char-
lie’s rare ‘RRM2B’ mutation of MDDS caused 
progressive brain and muscle damage.
Charlie was admitted to hospital at 2 months. A 
ventilator helped him to breath and he had recur-
rent seizures. He could not move his limbs and 
opened his eyes only intermittently, making it diffi-
cult to tell when he was in pain. Charlie’s parents 
became aware of experimental treatment (nucleo-
side therapy), where biochemical food supplements 
stimulate the repair of mitochondrial DNA. Results 
of nucleoside therapy on mice with the TK2 variant 
of MDDS (which usually leaves the brain unaf-
fected) increased lifespan slightly. Human trials saw 
13 (of 18) children with TK2 MDDS grow, and one 
improve their walking ability over 4 years. There 
was no evidence the therapy repaired the brain, nor 
was it tried on RRM2B MDDS. Nevertheless, a US 
expert claimed it might help Charlie.
Charlie’s doctors agreed to try the therapy. 
However, before a trial commenced, Charlie 
suffered several weeks of refractory epileptic fits. 
This caused severe brain damage and Charlie’s 
doctors believed he had no hope of improvement, 
counselling fatal withdrawal of ventilation. Char-
lie’s parents remain steadfast in their wish for 
further treatment, including nucleoside therapy. 
The hospital sought a court order that it would be 
lawful to withdraw treatment because treatment 
was not in Charlie’s best interests. Charlie’s parents 
argued that they knew Charlie best, and cared 
for him more deeply than anyone else. Yet, apart 
from Charlie’s parents and the clinician offering 
treatment, all witnesses agreed with Charlie’s 
doctors. The order the hospital sought was even-
tually granted, and affirmed in three subsequent 
appeals.2–5 A final spate of litigation settled when 
and where withdrawal would take place. Charlie’s 
parents bitterly complained that the outcome left 
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them ‘very little time’ before Charlie died.7 Withdrawal did not 
take place immediately, but after an unspecified period of time 
set out in a confidential annexe to the court order.6 Evidently, 
this was brief as reports of Charlie’s death were published after 
18:00 the following day.8–10
Pr And The lImITATIons of welfAre
Broadly speaking, a right may be seen as a way of empowering an 
individual against collective goals that disregard that individual’s 
legitimate interests.11 Moral rights are normative claims support-
able by reasoned arguments. Legal rights can be (and often have 
been) argued for on the basis of a putative moral right.12 Legal 
rights may impose binding duties on others to either enable or, 
more commonly, not to impede the exercise of that right. The 
potential to influence the actions of decision-makers makes it 
pertinent to consider moral rights when assessing whether Char-
lie’s case should alter our attitudes to the parental role in deci-
sion-making in similar cases.
In disputes about children’s care ‘[m]any of today’s critics 
of children’s rights are passionate defenders of … the rights of 
parents’13: different ethical approaches to children and parents 
make asymmetric claims about the putative moral rights of both 
parties. Arguments about rights may suggest that children: have 
rights; have rights that others (especially parents) should articu-
late; do not have rights. That parents: have rights based on their 
ability to advance the welfare of their child(ren); have rights over 
their children that are intrinsic to their status as parents. Broadly 
speaking (and leaving aside thornier issues of competence), my 
own considered moral judgement is that decisions concerning 
children who are unable to articulate their own wishes should 
be attentive to the child’s welfare. In other words, PR are deriv-
ative of their ability to advance the welfare of their child. This 
view is shared by many14–16 even if they disagree about the scope 
of such rights or how welfare should be measured. In Charlie’s 
case, welfare was a key factor for the courts. All sides (including 
the clinician proposing to deliver the innovative therapy) agreed 
that the chances of Charlie benefiting from treatment were 
‘vanishingly small’.7 Yet, while a focus on welfare suggests that 
the only basis of PR in this case was Charlie’s welfare, some 
unremarkable aspects of the case do not comfortably fit this 
welfare thesis. In particular, the decision to delay withdrawal of 
treatment for a brief period after the courts had reached their 
decision, however appropriate we might feel such behaviour 
is, clearly continued whatever harms Charlie was experiencing. 
Delaying withdrawal is not unusual in similar cases.17 Delays are 
likely to be motivated, at least in part, by consideration of the 
interests of Charlie’s parents rather than resting exclusively on 
Charlie’s parents’ ability to advance Charlie’s welfare. To coher-
ently explain why parents should be owed such respect, and to 
explore whether a similar basis suggests PR to have demands for 
experimental treatment met, it is important to consider the phil-
osophical basis of intrinsic PR. The next section explores some 
of these arguments.
InTrInsIC Pr
Arguments suggesting parents have an intrinsic right to be 
decision-makers for their children include the argument that 
parenting has a teleological basis and is a  good in itself.18 19 
Other arguments are based on the child being parental prop-
erty, termed ‘proprietarian’ accounts.12 I consider the latter to 
contain the strongest arguments for PR. Therefore, after briefly 
dismissing a teleological account, my discussion concentrates on 
these.
While teleological accounts vary, Page18 offers a particularly 
rich account. It asserts that both procreation and rearing chil-
dren are essential parts of being human, and thus a good in 
themselves. PR, Page argues, are like sexual rights; restriction 
of either offends human nature. Page’s arguments more strongly 
assert a right to procreate (eg, against parental licensing)20 than 
a right to rear. While a teleological account depends on the 
optimal fulfilment of human nature, known as 'flourishing', it is 
by no means clear that having children is essential to flourishing. 
Indeed, depending on how flourishing is construed, it may be 
salient to consider that having children may not be fulfilling 
for parents,21 nor that adults without children lack fulfilment. 
The status of parenting as a good in itself is open to question. 
More promising than teleological accounts are proprietarian 
accounts. Although thorough-going proprietarian arguments are 
rare, inclinations towards proprietarianism may be more wide-
spread. For example, some detect proprietarianism in Nozick’s 
influential libertarian philosophy.12 22 Indeed, English common 
law has been argued to implicitly recognise a property right in 
the child.23
Proprietarian accounts24 25—including that of the bioethicist 
H Tristram Engelhardt26—have a common root. They use claims 
made by John Locke27 about the nature of property and self-own-
ership as a basis for proprietarianism.26 Locke’s first claim is 
that producers have rights of ownership over the products their 
labours create. According to Locke, these ownership rights are 
gained by ‘mixing’ the producer’s labour with the product. 
Locke himself argued that children were not parental property. 
Some find Locke’s reasons for excluding children—that they 
are owned by God, not parents—unconvincing,28 and apply his 
arguments to children nevertheless.25 26 Yet the ‘mixed labour’ 
argument is a problematic source of PR, implying that anyone 
who makes efforts affecting a child has rights over that child,12 29 
and struggling with parental equality.12 30 Locke’s second argu-
ment is that people own themselves. This is commonly29 31 tied 
to claims that PR stem from their children being (in some sense) 
part of the parent’s bodies. Some think this could only realisti-
cally apply to pregnant women.12 32 Others argue that owner-
ship follows parental provision of the child’s genetic material25 
or genetic information.33 These arguments suffer a regress 
problem. Parents were children once and logically, parents must 
still be owned, in turn, by their own parents. To overcome the 
regress, children must sometime stop being parental property. 
However, genetic material is rapidly subsumed in a sea of new 
cells, meaning genetic propriety is lost early in gestation, while 
genetic information lasts a lifetime and so remains susceptible to 
the regress.33 However, the regress may be overcome if dwin-
dling ownership is based on emerging personhood.26
Personhood is a way of distinguishing morally important, and 
morally less important, beings. One account of personhood, from 
Singer,34 argues that being human is not a morally relevant prop-
erty. Instead he argues that moral status is conferred by being a 
person. A person in Singerian terms must be capable of conscious 
introspection and a sense of futurity. Thus, some animals will 
be persons (eg, chimpanzees) while some genetic humans are 
non-persons (eg, anencephalic infants). Although suffering to 
non-persons is morally undesirable, non-persons are less morally 
important than persons.35 Engelhardt links children’s putative 
non-personhood to proprietarianism, asserting children lack the 
faculties necessary to be persons, and thus start as the moral infe-
riors of their parents.26 As children mature, they attain person-
hood and become morally equivalent to their parents. Such an 
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account overcomes the regress problem. I suggest an account on 
PR based on this reasoning, prima facie, fairly strong. In the next 
section of this article, I critique this account to determine some 
limits of intrinsic PR.
The lImITs of InTrInsIC Pr
I have postulated a basis for intrinsic PR relies on two key 
elements: genetic propriety and children’s non-personhood. The 
scope of PR depends on the strength of these elements.
An obvious objection to this account is that children ought not 
to be described as property. An extraordinary range of commen-
tators take pains to emphasise this position.15 36 37 One basis given 
for this claim is that it harms children to be treated as property.29 
Yet proprietarians argue that parents are still be bound to treat 
their children non-malevolently.26 Restrictions against misuse 
are a well-argued feature of legitimate property rights, including 
an obligation not to use property to harm others.38 Lyons23 
argues that misuse of children could be prohibited by classing 
them as inalienable property, and this suggests the obligation 
against harm could extend to the child themselves. Argued this 
way, some consider the consequences of proprietarianism are 
proximate to the welfare view of PR.30 While describing chil-
dren as property may evoke concern, it is difficult to devise a 
convincing argument against PR founded solely on this basis. 
Nevertheless, we should note that the scope of proprietarian 
PR is restricted, although based on avoiding harm and misuse, 
rather than promoting welfare.
The proprietarian account appears more vulnerable in 
claiming that children are non-persons. The non-personhood 
claim coheres with widespread public intuitions that the life of a 
fetus is less morally important than the woman who carries it.39 
Without consideration of the moral status of fetuses here, these 
intuitions at least suggest arguments using personhood should be 
seriously considered when asserted in relation to older children. 
However, even if40 41 we accept that personhood is morally legit-
imate, it is arguable that under common personhood criteria, 
most children are persons, suggesting further limits to the scope 
of PR. Based on criteria of futurity and self-awareness, Singer34 
argues children in the neonatal period (<1 month) are non-per-
sons. Ross42 43 suggests that children up to late adolescence are 
not capable of rational decisions and thus ‘not full Kantian 
persons’. There is evidence that disputes these assumptions. 
Neonates appear to anticipate familiar events40 and distinguish 
their own touch44 and cry.45 This suggests neonates may possess 
a sense of futurity and self-consciousness—meeting Singerian 
criteria for personhood. Further, interviews with chronically ill 
children and their clinicians suggest that children as young as 
3 years old may be capable of making rational decisions,16 chal-
lenging Ross’ claims. On this basis, parents’ rights over their 
children arguably begin waning between a few days and a few 
years after birth. However, PR may be much more persistent in 
children who are severely intellectually disabled, like Charlie.
A final criticism of proprietarianism, which may further 
reduce the scope of PR, is based on criticism of genetic propriety. 
If parental property rights stem from parental ownership of the 
child’s genetic information, it appears to support the claim that 
genetically related parents should have a greater say in deci-
sions about their child than non-genetically related parents, 
such as adoptive parents. Yet it seems unconvincing to suggest 
this when the genetic parents have no interest in, care for, or 
knowledge of, their child. Even if we disregard these objec-
tions, genetic similarity seems a fragile basis on which to base 
exclusively parental rights. Although familial resemblances are 
commonly cited as important flags of identity,46 it is by no means 
clear that these socially constructed meanings rest on genetic 
resemblances rather than being proxies of social connection.47 
The global population has extensive genetic similarity48: other-
wise unconnected individuals have vastly more genetic informa-
tion in common than they do not.49 Genetic propriety accounts 
rest on a very slender material basis for such a connection 
between the child and the parent. Indeed, taken proportionately, 
it may also imply a shared genetic propriety of children. If the 
proportion of unique parental property in children is discern-
ible, but very small, perhaps the rights of parents that can derive 
from this property are proportionately small.
These arguments do not suggest that intrinsic PR cannot be 
made out. However, the scope of these rights is restricted. By 
being based on a property right they limit the PR to non-harmful 
acts. On the most generous account the emergent personhood 
of the child causes intrinsic PR to expire after a few years in 
most cases. Finally, intrinsic PR based on genetic propriety are 
little greater than the rights of unrelated humans. These tangible, 
but weak, reasons for intrinsic PR may support transient delays 
in securing their child’s welfare. However, they are unlikely to 
be strong enough to allow parents to undertake prolonged acts 
against their child’s well-being.
lookIng To The fuTure: Pr To ACCess To exPerImenTAl 
TreATmenT
Given the justifiable, but slim, bases for PR, one of the consid-
erations to arise from Charlie’s case is to ask under what 
circumstances PR could influence future cases about accessing 
experimental treatment. Having established that PR beyond 
those based on enhancing the welfare of the child are both 
weak and limited, crucial to such questions will be the harms 
and benefits likely to arise from experimental treatment. The 
experimental basis means benefits will be uncertain. Indeed, a 
defining feature of potentially fatal cases involving critically ill 
children is the disagreement about whether the same outcome is 
a harm or a benefit. On one side, living with intensive care may 
be understood to amount to harm, and death a benefit50; on the 
other side, loss of life is the greatest harm, and continued inten-
sive care is a benefit. This disagreement is additionally compli-
cated by the uncertain outcomes of experimental treatment. 
In Charlie’s case, the risks of experimental treatment alone (a 
food supplement) were inconsiderable. Intrinsic PR combined 
with uncertain and minimal potential benefit (because of Char-
lie’s brain injuries) were too weak to overcome the presence of 
uncertainty about harms, and a precautionary approach was 
taken. By precautionary approach, I mean broadly, the exer-
cise of the principle of precaution, where uncertainty about 
the harms and risks that arise from a technology new to science 
means we should err on the side of caution. While I lack space 
to offer detailed argument, such an approach has been cogently 
argued to be pertinent to the regulation of innovation in health-
care51 and neonatal non-treatment.52 Yet the ability to overcome 
reservations about uncertainty in pursuit of potentially great 
benefits may be a feature of intrinsic PR. In future cases where 
harm is minimal and benefits are uncertain, but potentially great, 
intrinsic PR may be determinative. However, there are other 
objections to accessing experimental treatment. First, are parents 
competent to make these judgements? Second, are there public 
interests grounds on which to deny competent demands?
If parents have rights to demand experimental treatment, an 
additional concern is whether they can rationally exercise these 
rights. Questioning the ability of terminally ill persons to make 
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rational judgements about experimental treatment, Caplan 
argues that terminally ill people are likely to view any experi-
mental treatment with undue optimism.53 The moral weight of 
these elements changes where the patient is a child. The question 
of parental competence to decide is a thorny one. The challenges 
to parental competence are clear if we consider Charlie’s case, 
where Charlie’s parents were vulnerable to manipulation by 
third parties.54 These emotional challenges lead some to ques-
tion the ability of parents to offer meaningful consent in life 
and death situations.55 Yet the enormity of parental bereave-
ment suggests that the degree of parental incompetence should 
be extreme indeed, if it is to over-rule a parental right of say 
(in practice, this circle is of course squared by the current legal 
process, which allows the courts to make a decision if parents 
and clinicians disagree).56
Bender et al57 offer public interest arguments for restricting 
access to experimental treatments. They argue that premature 
access to experimental treatments may raise false expectations 
among those with similar illnesses, igniting public demand. If 
this demand is not resisted, drugs may be made widely available 
before their effectiveness is proven, leading to potentially inef-
fective treatments becoming the standard of care. The authors 
also argue that early access to unproven drugs may both hamper 
recruitment to, and reduce industry incentives to run, clinical 
trials. First, recruitment is hampered because early access phys-
ically reduces the number of potential drug trial participants. 
Second, if drug companies are paid for access unproven drugs, 
it provides a commercial disincentive for clinical trial sponsor-
ship. Not only are trials costly and time consuming, but the fact 
they risk jeopardising a proven source of profit if the experi-
mental treatment proves ineffective provides a clear conflict of 
interest. These arguments suggest that, whatever the benefit to 
the patient, early access has opportunity costs, because inade-
quate knowledge of effectiveness denies future patients access 
to treatments with a proven basis. Ultimately there is a price 
to pay beyond the risks and benefits to an individual patient. 
However, preventing the exercise of individual choice to protect 
public interests may appear to be a paradigm case of group inter-
ests impinging on individual interests. This is what rights are 
designed to prevent. Certainly, it has been argued that where 
patients seek innovative lifesaving treatments a rights approach 
requires that any prohibition on treatment must be undergirded 
by extremely weighty risks if they are to defensibly outweigh the 
patient’s right to life.58
The choice of patients who are terminally ill to access treat-
ment may carry enough moral weight to overcome objections 
in the public interest. The weakness of PR alters the dynamics 
of such choices when the choice is a parental one. My anal-
ysis suggests that in a future case intrinsic PR could overcome 
uncertainty in the face of large potential benefits. Certainly, 
the English courts have in the past allowed access innovative 
treatment in such circumstances without an obvious prohibi-
tion in the public interest.59 Indeed, with the right approach 
these factors could be mitigated further in a future similar case 
to Charlie’s. There is little prospect of clinical trials on a rare 
mutation like RRM2B. Early access linked to a robust, if novel, 
trial design may accelerate understanding of the experimental 
drug, and thus allay public interest concerns. It is notable in 
Charlie’s case that no evidence was advanced that access was to 
be part of such a trial. Public interest concerns may therefore 
have placed additional obstacles in the way of PR in Charlie’s 
case.
ConClusIon
Charlie’s case brought questions about the moral status of 
parents and children into the public eye. The case apparently 
fell on welfare grounds; however, not every fact of the case is 
consistent with the promotion of Charlie’s welfare. Reviewing 
the grounds for intrinsic PR that are independent of the welfare 
of their child, I suggest the strongest of these lie in arguments 
for genetic propriety and children’s non-personhood. Critiquing 
these claims suggests limits to intrinsic PR. Nevertheless, I argue 
that these claims provide grounds to accept PR for experi-
mental treatment in future cases involving children who cannot 
contribute an opinion. These cases must involve no harm to the 
child and benefits, despite being uncertain, must be potentially 
great. Further, I argue parents are competent to exercise these 
rights, and that objections in the public interest may be overcome 
by evidence of robust trial design in the experimental treatment.
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